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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CIT·Y, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Appellant. 
vs. 
ANDREW REVNE, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 6330 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue s-quarely put to this Court is whether-or-
not: 
1. The Municipal ordinance (in question) is with-
in the express and implied power delegated to the City 
of Salt Lake. 
2. Assuming that the ordinance comes within the 
delegated and implied power, is said ordiTiance constitu-
tional1 
It is counsels' position that the ordinance in ques-
tion is not only outside the scope of the authority vest-
ed in Salt Lake City by the State Legislature of the 
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State of Utah, but that the ordinance in question is un-
constitutional. 
AROOMENT 
PROPOSITION I. THE ORDINANCE IN QUES-
TION IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE 
DELEGATED POWER TO LICENSE, TAX AND 
REGULATE BARBER SHOPS. 
In the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 15-8-39 it is 
stated that Municipalities may do as follows: 
''·They may license, tax and regulate, (nam-
ing many businesses and occupations) barfber 
shops, beauty parlors, etc.'' 
In the same compiled statutes, 15-8-84 it is stated 
the municipalities may make the following rules: 
''They may pass all ordinances and. rules, 
and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessa.ry for carrying into effe-ct or discharging 
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, 
and such as are necessary and proper to provide 
for the safety and preserve the health, and pro-
mote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace 
and good order, ·comfort and convenience of the 
city and the inhabitants thereof, and. for the pro-
tection of property therein;; and may enforce 
obedience to such ordinances with such fines or 
penalties as they may deem proper, etc.'' 
In 19 Ruling Case Law, Section 75 it is stated by 
the editors that: 
"The legislature of a state, merely by estab-
lishing a municipal corporation does not delegate 
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3 
to such corporation the right to exercise .all the 
governmental powers of the State within its ter-
ritorial limits, or even such powers as are com-
monly exercised by a municipal corporation of 
the same class. It i.s well settled that a municipal 
corporation has only such powers as awe clearly 
and unmistakably given to it by its charter or 
by other acts of the legislature, and consequently 
can exercise no powers not expressly granted to 
it except those which are necessary or incident to 
the powers expressly granted and those which are 
indispensable to the ·declared objects and powers 
of the corporation.'' 
Professor McQuillan, at Section 368 of Vol. I, of his 
work, Municipal Corporations, says: 
''The general, well-settled rule of construc-
tion is that a doubtful power is a power denied. 
Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the terms 
employed in the grant of power must he re-
solved against the corporation and in favor of 
the public." 
In City of South Bend v. Chicago, South Bend & 
N. I. Ry. Company, 179 Ind. 455; 101 N. E:. 628, (19,13), 
the court, at page 457 acknowledged the above rule of 
construction as follows: 
''No incidental powers are implied except 
those essential to the continued existence of the 
municipality and to the accomplishment of the 
purposes of its creation, and doubtful cla.ims of 
authority are resolved against the corporation. 
In the case at bar the only power delegated iby the 
state to the municipality of Salt Lake City is the power 
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4 
to license, tax and regulate. It cannot be reasonably 
implied from that express delegation that the city should 
have the power to establish compulsory closing hours 
for barber-shops. And if it cannot be reasonably im-
plied, certainly under the rule of strict construction it 
cannot 1he implied as a necessary incident to the express 
delegation to license, tax, and regulate. 
In State ex rei. Newman v. City of Laramie et al. 
decided in 19'29 by the Supreme Court of Wyoming; 
275 Pac. 106, the Wyoming ordinance provided: 
''No 1barber shop shall be opened for busi-
ness· earlier than 8 o'clock A. M. nor shall any 
barber shop close later than 6 o '.clock P. M. 
throughout the year, excepting on Saturdays and 
days preceding the following legal holidays, etc.'' 
·T'he Supreme court of Wyoming held that the or-
dinance was not a reasonable exercise of the delegated 
power given by the state to the municipality to license, 
re·gulate, and control barber shops, and therefore de-
dared the provision to be void. 
The Wyoming court duri·ng the course of its opinion 
made the following interesting quotation from Freund 
on Police Power: 
"Freund on Police Power, Sec. 142 and See. 
63 says that if a municipal ordinance, passed un-
der authority conferred in general terms is foun(l 
to be unreasonable, the court will say that the 
legisla.ture never mtended to give authority to 
pass it .... This is said to be particularly so 
in regard to ordinances having relation to the 
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liberty of the citizen or the rights of private 
property.'' 
The \Yyoming court then distinguished the Falco 
case, which will be referred to in detail later, as not be-
ing in point, because in that case the New Jersey State 
legislature expressly authorized the municipalities to 
provide opening and closing hours for 1barber shops. 
The \Yyoming court finally concluded the opinion 
by stating: 
'' \V e are of the opiniOn that the proVIsion 
complained of is not reasonable exercise of the 
power to license, regulate, a;nd control barber 
shops. It therefore is unauthorized and void.'' 
(All judges concurred). 
In City of Alexandria v. Hall, Sup. Ct. of Louisiana, 
1930, 171 La. 595; 131 So. 722, the court he1d invalid and 
unconstitutional a municipal ordinance requiring bar-
ber shops to close at 6:30 P. M. except on legal holidays, 
and said: 
''It is our conclusion, therefore, that section 
4 of ordinance 286 is not a reasonable exercise of 
the power of the City to regulate and control 
barber shops, and that this section is unconstitu-
tional, null and void as a whole.'' 
In Knight, Chief of Police, v. Johns decided by the 
Supreme Court of Miss., 137 So. 509, the court held. in-
valid a municipal ordinance requiring harher shops to 
close at 6 :30 on week days, and said : 
"Municipalities have only such authority to 
adopt ordinances as is expressly or impliedly 
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given them by the state, and we are referred to 
no statute under which they are authorized to 
regulate hours of labor; but assuming, for the 
purpose of the argument, that they have author-
ity to do so, this ordinance cannot be upheld 
thereunder. 'Into every power given a munici-
pality to pass by-laws or ordinances there is an 
implied restriction that the ordinances shall be 
reasonable, consistent with general law, and not 
destructive of a lawful 1business' quoting John-
son v. Philadelphia, 94 Miss. 34; 47 So. 526. 
PROPOSITION II. THE ORDINANCE REQUIR-
ING BARBER SHOPS TO CLOSE AT A FIXED 
TIME IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
While some of the cases involving closing hours for 
barber shops have avoided the constitutional question 
by deciding that such regulation is invalid as an un-
authorized exercise of the delegated police power, other 
cases have, even 1by way of dicta, as well as by direct 
decision, held such municipal ordinances unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that they are unreasonable, dis-
criminatory and in direct contravention of the due process 
,clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 
In Vol. VII of American Jurisprudence, 1937, at 
pages 617 and 618 the editors have this to say: 
"The majority of cases which have consid-
ered the validity of ordinances containing pro-
vision requiring barber shops to be closed at a 
certain fixed time on secular days have reached 
the conclusion that such provision have no rea-
sonable relation to the admittedly proper exer-
cise of the police power in regulating the profes-
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s£on of ba-rberi.ng. Any such regulations depend 
for their Yalidity upon the nature of the business 
sought to be regulated; that is, the nature of the 
business must the such that the public health, mor-
als, safety, or general welfare is, or might be, 
affected by such business being permitted to re-
main open or continue after certain hours. With 
regard to barbershops, such a regulation bea-rs 
no reasonable relat·ion to the public health or gen-
e ral ~eel fare; nor C(J/YI) it be supported on the 
theory that it will aid the enforcement of proper 
inspection regulations. 
All the commentators and cases recognize one land-
mark case that has ruled contra to the above stated prop-
osition. The case is Falco v. Atlantic City, decided in 
1923, 99 N. J. L. 19; 122 Atl. 610. In that case the valid-
ity of an ordinance, similar to the one in question was 
sustained. The court took the view that barber shops 
afforded a fruitful opportunity for the spreading of 
certain form of contagious diseases, and as a result 
thereof were, from a health standpoint, subject to strin-
gent regulations such as inspection, etc., and that to 
allow barber shops to remain open to the pu'hlic at all 
hours of the night might well be regarded as rendering 
ready and adequate inspection inconvenient or difficult, 
or even impossible, and consequently detrimental to pub-
lic health. 
It is significant that the municipal ordinance in-
volved in this case was expressly authorized by state 
legislatioiL Therefore the only question that could arise 
was the constitutionality of the ordinance. 
·The reasoning of this 1923 New Jersey case has 
been either ignored or repudiated by subsequent Cali-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
fornia, Washington, Wyoming, Utah, Georgia, Louis-
iana, Illinois, and Mississippi cases, and by a decision 
decided by the Federal Courts. 
The first case to be decided after the New Jersey 
case was the landmark case of Chaires v. City of At-
lanta, decided 1hy the Georgia Supreme Court in 1927; 
164 Ga. 75·5; 139 S. E. 559. In that case the city of At-
lanta passed an ordinance which, in the second section, 
contained the provision that ''All barber shops in the 
City of Atlanta shall hereafter be closed during the 
week days at 7 o'clock." The court held that the or-
dinance was void on the ground that it was unreason-
able, and said : 
''We can reach no other conclusion than 
that Sec. 2 of the ordinance is not based upon a 
lawful -classification, and that it is discrimina-
tory." 
And again the court said : 
''Persons engaged in the operation of bar-
ber shops are carrying on a perfectly lawful 
business. In fact, the business may he regarded 
as indispensable in the present development of 
our civilization, if we are to regard the require-
ments of decency and cleanliness. There is am-
ple evidence in the record to show that if the 
barber shops are closed at 7 o'clock in the even-
ings and not permitted to open until next morn-
ing, there will be a large and numerous class of 
citizens who cannot avail themselves of the serv-
ice of barbers.'' 
Two years later a similar ordinance presented it-
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self to the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the case of 
State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie et al., supra. 
"\Vhile the "\Yyoming court hased its decision on the 
grounds set out under Proposition 1, it was neverthe-
less anxious by way of dicta to give its opinion on the 
Constitutional question, and to repudiate the reasoning 
of the New Jersey case. The court had the following 
to say: 
''Unless the closing regulation in question 
bears a real and substantial relation to the pur-
pose of protecting the public from the spread of 
disease, it stands on the same footing as any sim-
ilar restriction on the right of a citizen to en-
gage in a harmless and useful occupation. 
The Wyoming court then quoted from State v. Ray, 
131 N. C. 814; 42 S. E. 960, where the defendant was 
charged with violation of an ordinance requiring the 
closing of stores at 7:30 P. M. The court said: 
"It must be admitted that the enforcement 
of this ordinance would !he to deprive the defend-
ant of his natural right-would be to interfere 
with the free use and enjoyment of his property, 
used in such a way as not to interfere with the 
rights of others. It is not shown, nor is it suggest-
ed that defendant's keeping his store open after 
7 :30 interfered with the rights of anyone else. 
It was said that the other merchants were will-
ing to close their stores at 7 :30 but the defend-
ant was not, and the ordinance was passed to 
compel him to do so, for the reason that if he 
kept open the others would be compelled to do 
so, or to give the defendant the benefit of the 
trade of the town after that time. But did this 
give the commissioners the right to close the 
defendant's store 1 
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It would seem that no legislative power exists 
under our form of government and our ideas of 
personal liberty, as to allow such interference with 
one's rights of ownership and dominion over his 
own property, except such interference be ex-
ercised for the protection and benefit of the pub-
lic. When such interference is authorized, it 
is under the doctrine of eminent domain, but it 
is said to be under the police power of 
the government. The attempted exercise of 
the power in this instance is clearly not under 
the doctrine of eminent domain, but it is said to 
be under the police power of the government. 
If the state could exercise such power (and we 
do not say it could) can a municipal corporation 
do so without express authority from the state. 
The Wyoming court then quoted from Saville v. 
Corless, 46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51 where the Utah Su-
preme Court considered a state law requiring commer-
cial and mercantile houses to close at 6 P. M. The 
court found several objections to the state law, but on 
the question of Constitutionality said, as quoted by the 
Wyoming Court: 
"We think it also offends against constitu-
tional right to enjoy, acquire, and possess prop-
erty, the most valuable of which is that of alien-
ation-the right to vend and sell. There are 
things the sale of which may be restricted, regu-
lated and controlled. But such legal interfer-
ence must rest on the police power of the state 
to promote or preserve public health, public 
morals, public safety, public convenience, and 
general welfare. The act here has no such pur-
pose, and in no sense tends to promote or pre-
serve public health, morals, peace, order, safety, 
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convenience, comfort or welfare. It is but an 
arbitrary and an unwarranted interference with 
a merchant's business. One or a number of mer-
chants may desire to close their stores at 6 
o'clock. They may do that. But they, by legis-
lation, cannot compel every other merchant to 
close at the same hour. They can run their own 
business, but not their neighbor's.'' 
After quoting the Utah case the Wyoming Supreme 
Court distinguished and criticized the New Jersey case, 
supra and said: 
"In the case relied on (Fal·co case) the 
statute plainly granted to the city the right to 
fix hours of closing. The court thought it prob-
able that this had been done in order to permit 
the city to make ready and adequate inspections 
that might otherwise be inconvenient, difficult, or 
even impossilble. In the case at bar, the city's 
power to fix closing hours does not arise from 
such a specific grant, and must exist, if at all, 
as an incident to the power to regulate. The 
power has been exercised by prescribing sanitary 
regulations, and by providing for inspections 
to see that regulations are followed. Such pro-
visions are conceded to be reasonable. There is 
nothing in the statute to show that the Legisla-
ture thought the municipal corporation would 
need to close the sliops in order more readily 
to inspect them, nor is there anything on the face 
of the ordinance to show that the closing of 
shops at 6 o'clock in the evening was necessary 
to facilitate inspection. There is nothing in the 
agreed facts to show when or how inspections 
are usually made. So far as we know, a barber 
shop in operation after 6 o'clock can be as 
readily and adequately inspected as one in op-
eration 1before that hour. 
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The possible suggested difficulty is that in-
spectors cannot be on duty at all hours of the 
night, without placing too great a burden on the 
municipality. Perhaps, to those who are fa-
miliar with the times and methods of inspecting 
barber shops, this reason would seem absurd. 
If, for instance, in the administration of such an 
ordinance an inspection is made of each shop once 
a month, once a week, or even once each 
day, there would seem to be no substantial 
reason for the claim that the closing of 
the shops at 6 in the evening was at all 
necessary to facilitate inspection. In the ab-
sence of facts, we may not !he justified in any 
definite assumption as to the frequency and na-
ture of the inspections. We cannot, however, re-
frain from saying that the record on appeal shows 
that, on an application for stay of execution, 
the relator presented to the district court his af-
fidavit, not contradicted, in which he states that, 
so far as he knows, the city health officer has 
never inspected his shop from May, 1927, when 
the ordinance was passed, to November, 1927, 
when the affidavit was made. 
There is hardly any business that cannot to 
some extent be regulated in the interest of the 
public health or safety. Freund Sec. 143. Laws 
prescribing sanitary regulations, requiring the 
maintenance of safety devices and the labeling 
of compounds, abound in the statutes of this and 
·every other state. Many of them have been in 
force for years. lVIost of thern provide for in-
spections, 1but it is only in the few recent cases 
that we have cited that it has been supposed that 
the right to inspect includes the right to restrict 
the operation of the business by fixing closing 
hours. It will readily be seen that a principle 
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that would permit the closing of barber shops 
as a reasonable exercise of the power to inspect 
would permit a like restriction in regard to many 
of the other businesses which are regulated unaer 
the police power. 
Following the \Yyoming case appears a decision 
decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana on Dec. 1, 
1930. There an ordinance was involved which required 
barber shops to close at 6 :30 P. M. except on days 
preceding legal holidays. ·The court in holding the 
ordinance unconstitutional said: City of Alexandria v. 
Hall, 171 La. 595 ; 131 So. 722 : 
''The city of Alexandria has attempted to 
maintain the constitutionality of the ordinance 
by the introduction of medical experts who have 
testified that the longer the hours of work are 
the more run down tbecomes the system of the 
barber, and the more susceptible he is to com-
municable diseases, and that thereby the public 
health may become endangered. 
In our opinion the public health is protected 
by the provisions of the ordinance itself requiring 
the inspection of tbarbershops, sterilization of in-
struments, and examination of all barbers sus-
pected of having communicable diseases. 
And again the court said: 
"A minority of 20% of the barbers in the city 
of Alexandria are opposed to the ordinance in 
question. The clear purpose of the ordinance 
is to make all barbers close their shops at the 
same time. No thought of the health of the 
community, in our opinion, was in the minds of 
the barbers or of the City Council when Sec. 4 
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14 
was written into the ordinance closing all the 
1barber shops during the week days at 6 :30 P. M., 
except on Saturdays when they must close at 
9:00 o'clock P. M. Besides, adequate health pro-
visions are taken care of in the uncontested pro-
visions of the ordinance. 
In 1933 a case involving compulsory closing hours 
for barher shops appeared in the Federal Courts. The 
case was McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 Fed. Supp. 855. 
In that ·Case an ordinance of the City of Seattle made it 
unlawful to keep open a barber shop except from 6 A. M. 
to 6 P. M. on week days, and from 6 A. M. to 7 P. M. on 
days preceding holidays. The Federal court ruled the or-
dinance unconstitutional as taking property without due 
process of law, and enjoined the City from enforcing it. 
The court said : 
''The ordinance takes from the plaintiff 
trade for assumed public be:aefit, five hours, 6 
P. M. to 11 P. M., every day except the days be-
fore Sundays and holidays when 4 hours are 
taken-7 to 11 P. M.-approximately 1-3 of his 
good will (property) without compensation or 
due process. This the city has no power to do." 
In Patton v. City of Bellingham et al, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Washington one year after the 
Federal case on Dec. 6, 1934, 38 Pac. (2nd) 365 the 
court held inv·alid an ordinance prescribing hours for 
opening and closing barber shops, on the ground that it 
was unreasonable and arbitrary, and consequently void. 
The court said : 
''Confining ourselves, then, to the ordinance 
and its effect, we have no hesitancy in saying, 
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fir~t, that the proYisions found therein, with ref-
erence to the inspection of barber shops, consti-
tute a Yalid exercise of the city's police power, 
and, as such, were reasonable and proper.'' 
The question then presents itself here wheth-
er the provision with reference to the time of 
opening and closing barber shops is reasonable 
and proper for the protection of the health and 
general welfare of the public, or whether it is 
unreasonable and arbitrary and an unlawful in-
terference with the rights of the individual. 
\Yhether the facts of a particular case war-
rant the assertion of police power is a judicial 
question to be resolved by the courts. Bowes v. 
Aberdeen, 58 \Yash. 535, 109 P. 3,69; Freund, Po-
lice Power, Sec. 142; 2 Dillon on Municipal Cor-
porations (2nd Ed.) Sec. 599. 
"\Yhile the interest of the public may be 
likened unto an irresistable force which compels 
where it requires, it nevertheless must, under 
constitutional provisions, both federal and state, 
respect the rights of the individual. While the 
latter may not occupy the fixity of an immov-
ruble object, they nevertheless have the protection 
and sanction of the fundamental law of the land, 
and they recede before no less a force than that 
of public necessity. 
To sustain the individual freedom of action 
contemplated by the Constitution is not to strike 
down the common good, but to exalt it; for sure-
ly the good of society as a whole cannot be better 
served than by the preservation against arbitary 
restraint of the liberties of its constituent mem-
'bers. '' (Quoting Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 
261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394). 
The occupation of barbering is a lawful busi-
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ness, and, so far from being an obnoxious one, 
it is now considered well-nigh indispensable. It 
may be conceded, as we have already conceded, 
that its relation to the public is such as the public 
may he protected against the spread of communi-
cable diseases and unsanitary practices. In so 
far as the ordinance seeks to require that such 
shops shall be operated in a clean and sanitary 
manner, and by clean and competent barbers, 
it is a wholesome measure and a valid exercise of 
the police power. But in our opinion, the 
avowed object of the ordinance bears no real or 
substantial relation to the reasonable protection 
of the public. It belongs, rather, in the cate-
gory of unreasonable restrictions upon the right 
of a citizen to engage in a useful and lawful 
calling and to acquire and possess property and 
to so use it as will not interfere with the rights 
of others. The ordinance seeks not merely to 
regulate a business, but to dictate its operation. 
"The right to labor or earn one's living in 
any legitimate field of industry or business is a 
right of property, and any unlawful or unrea-
sonable interference with or abridgement of such 
right is an invasion thereof, and a restriction 
of the liberty of the citizen as guaranteed by the 
Consti,tution. '' (Quoting Yee Gee v. City and 
County of San Francisco, ,D. C. 235 Fed. 757, 
759.'' 
''It is contended 1by respondents that it is 
necessary to limit the hours that a barber may la-
bor, in order to prevent fatigue with its conse-
quent hazards to the general public. It will be ob-
served that the ordinance does not by its terms 
limit the hours of labor at all, but merely at-
tempts to limit the time within which a shop may 
be kept open. If a shop remained open twenty-
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four hours of the d.ny, working two shifts of 
six hours each, there would be no violation of 
any regulation as to the hours of labor. It may 
be true, as suggested in the testimony of some of 
the witnesses that the enforcement of the ·Or-
dinance would serve to deflect a portion of ap-
pellant's business to other shops of the city, 
and thus secure a fairer division. But that re-
sult, eYen though it should follow, is, in our 
opinion, no valid reason for compulsory inter-
ference with the lawful business of the individu-
al. If the principle thus contended for is upheld, 
then the city council could limit the opening and 
closing of shops to any period that it saw fit, 
with the view of equalizing the incomes of all. 
Such legislation, if upheld, might be the first in-
stallment of a plan or system by which all shops 
would be required to pool their revenues for equal 
division. In our opinion, the provisions of the 
ordinance requiring the shops to close at speci-
fied hours bear no reasonwble relation to the pub-
lic health or general welfare. The evidence in 
the case, upon which findings of the court are 
based, rests upon conjecture and not upon any-
thing of a substantial nature. 
''It is suggested by respondents in their 
brief that the closing of the shops at· an early 
hour wold facilitate inspection by the authori-
ties and members of the board of inspection. 
(Suggested by the reasoning in the Falco case, 
supra). But certainly ample opportunity now 
exists for reasonwble inspection, and certainly 
the situation does not call for an absolute closing 
of the shops in order that inspectors may go upon 
the premises ; otherwise the right of inspection 
would not be an incident of regulation, but would 
be a lever by means of which the business would 
be largely controlled.'' 
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'';T'he following cases have been called to 
our attention, involving ordinances containing 
provisions practically identical with those with 
which we are here concerned. Falco v. Atlantic 
City, State v. City of Laramie, City of Alexandria 
v. Hall, Knight v. Johns, McDermott v. City of 
Seattle. (All cited within this brief). The first of 
these cases supports the contention of the re-
spondents. The remaining five hold the ordin-
ances in question either unconstitutional or else 
unreasonruble and void. The cases differ some-
what in their reasoning and in the grounds on 
which their conclusions are rested. All, HOW-
EVER, reach the same result. We have herein-
above adopted some of the statements made in 
several of them, and therefore will not take 
further space in analyzing or quoting from 
them.'' 
"We are of the view that the provisions of 
the ordinance relating to the hours of opening 
and ·closing barber shops are unreasonable and 
arbitrary, and consequently void. The decree of 
the trial court is therefore reversed, with direc-
tion to enter in Hs place a decree permanently 
enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance to 
the extent last mentioned.'' 
After the Washington case appears a line of Cali-
fornia cases, all decided in the years 19,35 and 1936. The 
first of these, decided in 1935 by the Supreme Court of 
California clearly shows the disposition of the Califor-
nia court on this identical question. The case is Gan-
ley v. Claeys et al, Sup. Ct. of California, 1935, 40 Pac. 
(2nd) 817. There the court held that an ordinance reg-
ulating barber shops, and providing that said ibarber 
shops mu:;t be closed from 6 :30 P. M. until 8 A. M. of 
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the following morning, except on Saturdays and days 
preceding specified holidays \Yas void, having no rea-
sonable relation to public health, which was the avowed 
purpose a~signed for its adoption. 
The court first cited from an earlier California 
case, Ex P.arte Jentzsch, Sup. Ct. of Cal, 1896; 112 Cal. 
468; 44 Pac. 803, where the court had held a barber 
statute which required barber shops to close after 
12:00 o'clock on legal holidays unconstitutional because 
it was special, unjust, and unreasonable, working an 
invasion of individual liberty, since it was based upon 
no distinction to justify singling out that class of labor-
ers. 
After citing the J entzsch case with approval the 
court proceeded to say : 
''It is asserted by appellants, however, that 
the present case is different from the one there 
considered, because since that time, the state, 
by the California Barber Law has acted to regu-
late the husiness of barbering and has defined 
therein unsanitary practices and provided for the 
appointment by the board of barbers of such in-
spectors as are necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of the act. . . . It is said that the 
inspectors are only on duty from 9 a. m. until 
5 P. M. and that 90 per cent .of the complaints 
from the public concern violations occurring 
late in the evening or on Sundays or holidays ; 
hence the ordinance is a health measure. 
''However, a reading of the barber law will 
convince the most skeptical that the state has 
provided a complete plan or method for the reg-
ulation of the business and to prevent anyone 
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from engaging therein who does not conform 
to the standards therein announced.'' 
It should be pointed out at this point that the legis-
lature of the State of Utah has provided similar sani-
tary measures for barber shops to those provided by 
the California legislature. 
In the Revised Statutes of Utah, 193'3, under the 
heading SANITARY REGULATION OF CERTAIN 
BUSINESSES, 35-1-12, it is provided: 
"The State Board of Health may adopt 
reasonwble rules and regulations prescribing 
sanitary requirements for medical practitioners, 
dentists, pharmacists, barber shops, barber 
schools, cosmeticians and beauty shops, and 
cause such rules and regulations to be printed 
in suitable form and transmit a copy thereof to 
each registered medical practitioner, dentist, 
pharmacist, cosmetician, and proprietor or man-
ager of a barber shop, barber school or beauty 
shop.'' 
SANITATION IN CERTAIN PLACES OF BUSI-
NESS, 35-1-13: 
''The health commissioner may inspect dur-
ing business hours the following named places 
and objects for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether the same are maintained in a clean and 
sanitary condition, to-wit: 
(1) The offices, equipment, tools, instru-
ments, laboratories, appliances, line and supplies 
of all medical practitioners, pharmacists, dentists, 
barber shops, barber schools, cosmeticians and 
1beauty shops. 
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eNPROFESSION.AL CONDUCT DEFINED, 79--
4-18: 
''The department . . . The words '' unpro-
fessional conduct'' as relating to barbers, stu-
dents, apprentices and teachers are hereby de-
fined to include: 
(5) Keeping a shop, its furnishings, the 
tools, utensils, or appliances used therein in un-
clean or insanitary condition. 
(8) Conducting a school in an insanitary 
manner or violating any rule of the department 
regulating the conduct of barber schools. 
(2) Practing when affiicted with a con-
tagious or infectuous disease. 
( 7) Violating any of the provisions of this 
chapter, or any rule of the state board of health 
prescribing sanitary requirements of barber 
shops or schools. 
It appears to counsel that it should he clear to the 
court from the wbove statutory provisions that the 
health of the citizens of the state is protected by sani-
tary regulations of barber shops by state legislation, 
and in the proper and accepted manner, and that a 
municipal ordinance providing for the compulsory clos-
ing hours, under the excuse that it is necess·ary for the 
health of the community is entirely unwarranted, and 
an obvious misuse of the delegated police power for 
unconstitutional union legislation. 
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ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S CASES AND 
EVIDENCE 
Before discussing the barber cases cited by appel-
lant it seems sensible to address the court's attention 
once again to the hasi'c inquiry in this case. It is: 
Does the City Commission have the power to pass 
the ordinance in question? If the Commission has such 
power it must be one of three types. (1) A power that 
·could be called inherent. ( 2) A power expressly given 
to the City by a higher authority. {3) A power that can 
be implied f-rom an express power given. These cate-
gories are sufficiently inclusive. Yet the pretended pow-
er of the City Commission to pass an ordinance requir-
ing Barber Shops to close at a specific time cannot be 
established under any of these headings. Counsel, to 
clarify his position, will consider each in turn and show 
that the City has presented neither reason nor author-
ity which will sustain this court in establishing the 
validity of this ordinance. 
(1) The power is not inherent in the City to pass 
this type of ordinance : It should not 'be necessary to 
go to any great length to demonstrate that the com-
mission has no inherent power to pass the ordinance. 
The simple and well established fact is that no inherent 
powers attach to a municipality created by the legisla-
ture, unless that municipality has a home rule charter 
under State Constitutional provisions which provide for 
such ~charters. 
In the City of Chicago vs. M. & M. Hotel Co., 
93 N. E. 753, the court expresses very well the signifi-
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cance of the relationship between the State and Mu-
nicipality as follows: 
"The state leg·islature has inherent power 
to pass any law it sees fit, unless it contravenes 
some proYision of the State or Federal Constitu-
tions The legislature may delegate all or a part 
of its power to municipalities created by the leg-
islature. Among the essential powers of the gov-
ernment are the taxing power, the police power, 
and the power of eminent domain. These powers 
belong to the State. ·They are essential to the 
existence of government. The State cannot di-
Yest itself of these powers and retain its sov-
ereignty. Stripped of these great powers the 
state would become subordinate to the munid-
pality or corporate entity in which such powers 
were vested. The mere delegation of any of the 
powers does not divest the state of its sover-
eign right to exercise them for itself or to take 
them away from municipalities at its pleasure. 
Counties, townships, school districts, cities, vil-
lages and other municipal and quasi-municipal 
corporations are created under the authority of 
the legislature. These, and all other local munici-
palities which are authorized by the legislature, 
derive their existence and all their powers from 
the legislature of the State creating them. There 
is therefore no such thing as an inherent power 
in any municipality which is created by legisla-
tive enactment.'' 
This Illinois court is simply stating the commonly 
accepted view, and one to which ·counsel for the City 
will no doubt accede. 
While municipalities operating under Home Rule 
Charters do not, strictly speaking, have inherent pow-
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ers, they do have plenary powers in local affairs. Inas-
much as the City relies for authority on cases taken 
from home rule cities counsel would like, briefly, to 
point out the significant distinction that exists between 
a home rule city, and a municipality of enumerated dele-
gated powers, as exists in our own community and State. 
In 43 Corpus Juris, page 275, Se-c. 294, under the head-
ing: Home Rule Provisions, the following may be noted: 
"In many jurisdictions the late tendency is 
to secure to municipal communities freedom of 
action in matters pertaining to local affairs. Nu-
merous constitutional provisions have been enact-
ed to safeguard municipal corporations from in-
terference by the State legislature .... The or-
dinary effect of these ·constitutional provisions 
under consideration is to empower the municipal 
corporation to incorporate in its charter powers 
and functions that are municipal or local in 
character. In so far as ordinances or regulations 
are enacted in the exer'cise of that power, they 
supersede state laws in conflict therewith, and in 
regard to such powers and functions the corpora-
tion is free from the control or supervision of the 
legislature. 
Obviously, such cities have a great deal more free-
dom than the ordinary -city of enumerated powers. And 
of course the rule of construction employed in constru-
ing municipal legislation is entirely different from that 
properly employed in the case at bar. In a Home Rule 
City, once the problem of whether or not the ordinance 
is local or not is decided, the only question that can 
arise is whether or not the ordinance is constitutional. 
And of ·course, the proper rule of construction in deter-
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mining constitutionality is the liberal rule, one which 
fayors validity, and determines all doubts in favor of the 
enactment. That is probably why the Ohio cases cited 
by the appellant in its brief talk only of constitutional-
ity, and refrain from mentioning the strict delegated 
powers. 
Ohio, it should be pointed out, has a special con-
stitutional provision providing for Home Rule Cities, 
as set out in the cases cited. These cases are only au-
thority for the proposition that the ordinance in ·ques-
tion in this case is constitutional. 'They in no manner 
whatsoever can have ,any bearing on the validity of the 
ordinance passed by the City of Salt Lake as construed 
under the theory of delegated powers. And that ques-
tion, counsel frankly feels, is the vital and crucial prob-
lem that must be decided ·by this court. 
(2) The power to provide compulsory closing 
hours for barber shops is not expressly delegated to the 
municipality. 
The court need only ·consider the Revised Statutes 
of the State of Utah, 1933, Sec. 15-8-9, wherein the 
power given to the City is expressly stated as follows : 
''They (cities) may license, tax and regulate, 
etc. (listing a large number of business including 
barber shops) ''. 
It is perfectly clear that this statutory provision 
does not expressly delegate to the city power to compel 
barber shops to close at a specified hour. 
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It should he noted at this point that one of the 
cases relied upon by the city is a jurisdiction where the 
State Legislature has in positive and clear terms dele-
gated to the City express power to regulate the closing 
hours of barber shops. The case is that of Fal,co v. At-
lantic City, already cited by both plaintiff and defendant. 
In that case the Legislature provided that cities were 
allowed ''to pass, enforce, alter or repeal ordinances, 
regulate the opening and closing of barber shops on 
Sunday and holidays, also week days". 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Pearce v. 
Moffatt, 9'2 P. 2nd 146, -cited by appellant, decided that 
an ordinance passed by the City of Boise regulating 
closing hours for !barber shops was ~constitutional. 
The case is very interesting because it contains a 
rather complete review of all prior decisions deciding 
the question of the constitutionality of similar ordinances 
and statutes. It is of limited applicability, however, as 
the decision does not consider what ·Counsel and Judge 
Schiller felt was the eontrolling question-that of ultra 
vires acts of municipal corporations. 
It appears that the State of Idaho-unlike the State 
of Utah-has a legislative enactment providing for com-
pulsory closing hours for barber shops. It then ap-
pears that the City of Boise passed an ordinance con-
sistent with the state legislation, providing for compul-
sory dosing hours. The District Court in Boise found 
the ordinance and statute unconstitutional and the plain-
tiff Pearce then brought this suit to enjoin prosecution 
under the statute and ordinance. 
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The court in a 2-3 divided op1n1on helJ that the 
ordinance was constitutional and the statute was un-
constitutional. All of the argument was limited to that 
one question. Nothing was said about the question of 
the theory of delegated powers and ultra vires acts of 
municipalities. This is understandable in view of the 
state legislation w·hich expressly authorizes such regu-
lation, and in view of the manner in which the question 
was presented to the ·court. The lower court had held 
both the ordinance and statute unconstitutional, and the 
appeal went to that question solely. Of course, if there is 
a statute expressly authorizing such regulation then 
the only question that can arise is whether such regu-
lation is constitutional. But query, when the Idaho 
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and 
the ordinance constitutional didn't the question of ul-
;tra vires acts of municipalities presents itself, and 
shouldn't the court have addressed itself to that prob-
lem on its own initiative~ ·That the court omitted to 
do s-o is clear. All argument was confined to the ques-
tion of constitutionality. The decision is also not very 
clear on why the statute was unconstitutional and why 
the ordinance was constitutional, unless it was because 
the statute was discriminatory in confining the regula-
tion of hours to cities of the first and second class. 
Otherwise the constitutional question is identical in 
both cases. 
Of course, the two dissenting judges felt that the 
ordinance and the legislation were unreasonable ex-
ercises of the police power and consequently unconsti-
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tutional enactments. This court will find their opinions 
interesting, and counsel feels, should see in them 
a much sounder line of reasoning than that followed by 
the majority opinion. However, from the beginning 
of this litigation ·counsel has felt that the real problem 
which any competent court must decide is simply this: 
Does the general authorization given by the state of 
Utah to Salt Lake City to license, tax, and regulate 
1barber shops, along with most every other business, give 
Salt Lake City the implied power to impose upon neigh-
borhood and down town barber shops alike a compul-
sory closing hour (not a minimum hour day) beyond 
which they cannot conduct their private business. The 
Idaho decision gives no assistance whatsoever on this 
proposition. It simply indicates that on the constitution-
al question, the ·court could not agree. Certainly, in the 
face of such serious constitutional problems, this court 
·Cannot say that the State of Utah intended Salt Lake City 
have implied power to do that about which there is se-
rious doubt that the State of Utah could itself do. 
Counsel has already pointed out at some length 
in this Brief that the rule of construction as it relates 
to implied powers of municipalities is a stdct rule, one 
that is diametrically opposed to the rule indulged in 
favor of constitutionality. Counsel for the City has 
not cited a single case wherein the Court has implied 
powers in a case analagous to the one at bar. On the 
other hand, the Wyoming case, State ex rel. Newman v. 
City of Laramie et al, quoted by defendant in his prior 
Brief, is directly in point. In that case, the State leg-
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islation provided that the municipalities coultl license, 
regulate and control 'barber shops. This delegation of 
power is, if anyt bing, more broad and liberal than that 
provided by the Legislature of the State of Utah. The 
\Yyoming Supreme Court had no hesitation in deter-
mining that the power to close barber shops at a speci-
fied hour coufd not be implied from the grant of power 
provided. 
Counsel does not desire to ·comment on the evidence 
produced in court by the City in its endeavor to support 
the proposition that the municipal ordinance in question 
is necessary for the health, peace and safety of the com-
munity. If anything, the redundant testimony offered 
simply showed an over-zealous attempt on the part of the 
·Barber Union to prop up a flimsy piece of class spon-
sored legislation. This evidence. alone shows most con-
clusively that the ordinance is arbitrary and special, 
and is directed by Union forces to only one of the many 
businesses which the municipality is given power to reg-
ulate. The Judge before whom this evic1ence was heard 
had the following comment to make: 
DECISION OF THE COURT CASE NO. 10743 
AS SHOWN BY THE RECORD, 7TH 
PARAGRAPH. 
''This case, at the court's insistence, was 
tried on its merits. A mass of testimony was 
introduced by Salt Lake City for the purpose of 
showing that an ordinance regulating the hours 
of business of barber shops was necessary and 
incident to the effective regulation of barber 
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shops and in any event that the ordinance bore a 
real relationship to the preservation of health 
and safety in the ~community. Without review-
ing the city's evidence in detail, suffice it to say 
that it was not convincing to the Court. It dis-
closed no necessary or even incidental relation-
ships between the power to regulate and. the fix-
ing of hours of business nor was any realistic 
connection shown between the health and safety 
of the inhabitants of 8alt Lake City and the re-
quirement that barber shops remain open only 
during designated hours.'' 
If we have arrived at a stage in our society where 
compulsory ·closing hours are desirable, the State Leg-
lature, which is the policy forming ~body of our State 
and Government should formulate a general law. Even 
then our courts would have the grave question of con-
stitutionality to determine. Certainly the City Com-
mission, urged by Union leaders, should not be allowed 
under our theory of municipal government to enact a 
special law on a troublesome legal and social question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH & ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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